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Abstract 
The evaluation of benefit streams from educational investments 
present particular difficulties in countries with, chronically distorted 
wages in the "formal" urban sector and rapidly changing supply-demand 
relations for educated labour. Particularly problematic is the gap 
that opens up between the private and the social payoff to the invest-
ments and the conflict over both the quantity and ;'mi:x:' of different 
forms and orientations of education in any expansion of the system* 
The private returns generate the political pressure, but the social 
returns should presumably be considered in any economic rationale for 
the investments. 
These notes, with the help of a simple migration model, look 
at some of the issues connected with the estimation of educational 
benefits, and conclude that it is rural and agricultural pursuits, into 
which the increments to the educated labour force are going to have 
to be absorbed (despite whatever they hoped about an urban wage job), 
that must now be examined with respect to the payoff of educational 
expansion. This conclusion follows from the requirement that we concern 
ourselves with the margin (i.e. increment to supply), and with social 
rather than private returns. 
These somewhat random notes were written in response to a last 
minute request, made in the short hectic period before my departure for 
a year to analyse a large quantity of data that might shed light on 
some of the above questions. They undoubtedly bear the stamp of the 
innumerable interferences and preoccupations that inevitably characterize 
such a period. 
A large part of the .justification for the rather massive investments 
that are being made in the educative field is that thej will pay off in 
real economic terms. There kre'various ways in which this payoff can be 
garnered by an economy or an individual, but 'fundamentally they require 
that the person'educated have a job (with job defined to include self 
employment)' and,"as far as the'economy is concerned, that he be more 
productive in that job than he would have been had he not been the 
recipient of the"'educative investment. It is, of course, possible for the 
individual to receive his payoff by using his educational attainment to get 
himself a higher paying job than he could otherwise have acquired, despite 
the fact -that he.is no more productive in that job than someone with less 
education-or,than he would have been if he had not had so much" education; 
here, indeed, is one of the aroas< of market failure which motivate'the 
enormous private, pressure for-more education', way beyond" the point at which 
it is justifiable socially. An understanding of this divergence between 
the social and private payoff to education is crucial to investment decision-
making in this area. We will return to it anon. 
By virtue of the fact .that it is relatively cheap and easy to expand 
school output, and expensive and•difficult to expand- employment to keep 
pace, an..increasing proportion, and certainly an increasing number of school 
leavers face, "'unemployment'7 in the sense that they will not; .be. able. ±'oL get 
the sorts of jobs they would like and for which their•schooling has, at 
least in terms of expectations, :prepared them. If this definition of 
unemployment is accepted, an^ i it is certainly the definition implicit in a 
good deal of the discussion of this issue, then the main- effcct of ..... . 
additional cduc '/fcion is to swell the ranks of the unemployed' .Jo the 
extent that the additional school-leavers that do not find the employment 
they are after persist in a fruitless search for an "appropriate" job, both 
they and society are denied the payoff of their education, and to the extent 
that their education makes them persist' in unrealistic job-hunting and turn 
down agricultur ,1 or other employment where their marginal product could, at 
least.,.'have exceeded zero, 'both the private and public returns to education 
are negative, and education does indeed increase unemployment. Society's pay-
off rmay become substantially negative if these educated unemployed become more 
disruptive or capable of extracting, more in terms of consumption goods, 
services and amenities than they would otherwise have been. • 
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Let us assume for the present that the former kind of negative 
payoff, resulting from the greater propensity of the educated to persist 
in •'unrealistic hopes for "modern sector" employment will not continue 
indefinitely.^ In other words, while there will always he an urban pool 
of hopefuls (whose size, for given migrant preferences, is generally 
thought of as depending positively on the rural-urban wage gap and on 2 
the probability of finding an urban job), the vast majority of school 
leavers will eventually end up in some sort of employment in the rural 
areas . 
For.this group that does take up rural employment, the necessary 
condition for a positive payoff to their education has been fulfilled; 
they are involved in some productive activity, they have jobs. For that 
condition also to be sufficient, however, depends on this educated 
group being more productive in the jobs they have than they would have 
been had they not been the recipients of the education. 
The major contention of this paper is a direct consequence of the 
arguments presented so far, it is as follows: the economic rationale for 
expanding education, and the direction in which society should, from the 
economic point of view, expand its educative investments, depends on the 
payoff, and the relative payoff to different types of educative activities, 
in the rural areas. The reason is simply that the vast majority of the 
increments to the educated labour force resulting from these additional 
investments are going to be employed, if at all, in the rural areas. 
It should be noted that the contention is obviously not that all 
educated people will have to find jobs outside the modern sector; the 
contention refers to the margin, to the educated labour force increments 
that are the product of expanding the school system. But it is the margin 
1 I use quotp.tions for modern sector because of the view that it is 
a non-indigenous subsector of the modern sector that sets the aspirations 
in terms of wages in urban employment. The "informal" urban sector, generally 
low in wage and sparing in it's use of capital does not lend itself in 
the same way to dualistic model building, that generally relegates it, 
in fact, to the other ("traditional", "subsistence", "rural" or some such 
title) sector, despite its far more indigenous, and perhaps less anachronistic, 
characteristics. With this brief apology these notes will, albeit shame-
facedly, follow the dualistic approach. 
2 See Harris and Todaro ( 1968) and a long line of migration models since. 
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•that must "be examined, in any attempt at rational investment decision making, 
and the educational sector is certainly no exception to this rule. The 
fact9 for instance, that our schools have made, and continue to make an 
enormous contribution to the development effort, providing the economy 
with the educated manpower which is essential to the functioning of the 
entire productive system, is, in itself, no argument for expanding the 
schools. It is particularly no reason for expanding the schools if the 
payoff to the additional investment in school-leavers is very low or 
negative. The rationale for expanding the school system must be sought 
in the area where the additional school-leavers, resulting from the expansion, 
will be employed, and in the difference their educational experience makes 
to their productivity in that employment. The overwhelming weight of 
evidence that the existing school system can already oversupply the needs 
of the modern sector by a very large margin, certainly at the primary 
school level, and that the relative rate of expansion of school leavers 
and modern sector employment is such that additonal school-leavers are 
going to have to return to the rural sector, is now too well documented 
to bear repitition.. An expansion of schooling is going to result in an 
expansion of the number of school leavers who enter agriculture. 
One of the most striking findings for anyone who looks at data that 
include both educational level and some indication of employment history 
for rural people in Kenya is likely to be the marked association between 
any form of schooling and, at least attempted, migration out of the rural 
area and into wage employment^ Perhaps the most familiar historical 
characteristic of the school system, at least in terms of the expectations 
of its clientele, is its orientation away from rural and 
3 In my own survey, "piggy-backed" onto the Small Farm Enterprise Cost 
Survey of the Ministry and Finance and Planning Statistics Division, all of 
which has yet to be analysed, the association was very evident, even at the 
data coding stage. The main survey, which contains detailed economic data 
gathered in tiirelve monthly visits from a sample of some 1,700 farms through-
out Kenya, together with the additonal survey "which was designed to 
discover the human resource characteristics (i.e. the schooling training, 
extension exposure, farm and non-farm experience, etc. ) of the farm decision-
makers concerned, will now be used to answer questions about the returns 
to different types and forms of educative investment in the small farm sector. 
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agricultural pursuits. There is, in fact, a considerable history of parental 
antagonism to any efforts on the part of educ. .tors or school reformers to 
reorient the school toward rural concerns and occupations. The educators 
have frequently responded to this antagonism with the implication that .it 
is highly irrational. It is now emerging, however, that the migration 
decision has often been a very rational response to the incentives as they 
exist for the potential migrant, especially, as we shall see, if he has been 
to school. Whether this orientation to education is rational from a social 
point of view, and even whether it will continue to pay off privately, we 
will now discuss. 
To facilitate a discussion of the migration phenomenon and to permit us 
to look at the effects of education (i.e. schooling) on the principal variables 
in the, migration decision, let.us formulate, in grossly oversimplified fashion, 
the calculation for (e.g.) a school-leaver who has the'choice of either 
4 
staying and working on the farm or migrating in search of an urban job. 
Let us, then, envisage a potential migrant who has the option of going 
to town and spending a year hunting for a job, at the end of which time he 
either suddenly finds a job with which he stays, or else comes back to work 
on the farm. His other option'is, of course, to remain and work on the farm. 
At any point in time he must compare the anticipated present value of the 
income (read utility) stream, V^, thatLhe expects from embarking on' a job 
hunt, with the value of the stream, V^, that he can expect on the farm. If 
V^ and Y^ depend on the migrant's time preference rate, r, the urban and 
agricultural wage rates-, W and W , and on the probability, P of finding an u a 
urban job at the end -of the year, failing which an agricultural job can be 
taken up, either job being kept up 'until year T, then; 
4 Connoisseurs of migration models are going to miss all the trimmings 
and refinements that bring the models closer to reality. This one can'not 
even boast a frosting, let alone cherry.and candles. Migration here is 
instantaneous and costless, the effects of differential amenities "are ignored, 
the rural job is always ready and waiting and the urban job is an all-or-
nothing proposition at the end of a year's search. There is no room for 
informal sector urban employment or half-way houses. If a job is found it is 
hold at a constant wage until -year T, when the worker presumably drops out 
of the labour force. Perhaps most serious for our purposes, this initial 
formulation does not allow, for differences between migrants'. We discuss the 
relaxation of this migrant uniformity assumption later and particularly the 
desirability of including educational subscripts, but even that is' not 
treated formally here. 
V1 = P W u i ( 1 + r ) t + ^ Wa f ( 1 + * ^ 
v = w + w c C 1 + (2) 
At any point, it is worth continuing the scarch for an urban job if 
V-, > V0, i.e., if: 
PW d + (l-P) W d > W + W d where d = ip (l + r) t (3) u a - a a j. 
or Pd (I»r - Wa) > W a (4) 
°r P > _ a ,_„_ ( 5 ) 
d ( u a; 
To shed more light on P, the perceived probability of finding urban 
employment above which a migrant will be motivated to stay in the pool of 
urban job-hunters, let us note that 
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d = h (1 + r)~Jc = J ^ i l i r l ^ ( 6) 
T x J J-/ 1 N't — "t 2 T . f 1 \ Let d = (•« 1 - * x = x + x + ... + x , where x = (-——--) 1+r y 
2 3 T+l . . xd = x + x + 0 01 + x 
T+l Subtracting: d - xd = x - xJ' - d (l-x) 
. d = , 
T+l x ~ x 
and that if r is positive and T is-, large, (l+r) 1 can safely "be ignored, 
d, therefore, "becomes 
r 
Using the above in (5) vre see that the job-hunter will not ho 
motivated to return homo while: 
P \ a or P > W - W ~ " (7) 
v ^^  a' W ' a 
the probability of finding a job is greater than the rate at which the 
future is discounted, over the proportional urban-rural wage gap, 
which we might call g. 
It is perhaps surprising, trying out some likely figures in the above 
inequality, what a low probability of finding an urban job will still 
attract migrants to maintain the search. If the urban wage is only twice 
the rural, so that g = 1 then the ftindifference probability", that 
probability of finding an urban job which leaves the migrant indifferent 
between searching for one for another year or going home (ignoring transport 
costs), is r, the migrant's rate of-time preference (interest rate). 
For a given wage gap and a given perception of P, it is clearly r, the 
impatience factor?;which equilibrates the number of migrant job applicants.. 
One might think of a migrant with an initially low r, considerably below the 
perceived P, hunting fruitlessly for a job, wearing out the-welcome of his 
kin,-and finally using up whatever resources he h.-,s. Over this period, r, his 
time preference rate for cash, must climb quite steeply until it is clearly 
above P, at which point he gives up the search, goes home and tries his hand 
at (presumably available) rural employment. 
The other mechanism explaining the return flow is, of course, a 
changirgperception of P, the probability of finding an urban job. A migrant 
may, in the initial stages be quite sanguine about his own prospects, his per-
sonal perception of P might be quite high. Again, aften a few years of 
being turned down and met with "hakuna kasi" (110 work) signs'his'perception 
of P might be considerably lower. 
6 His objective P might of course decline as well over a period. 
Employers are o:r'ten (understandably) chary about taking someone who lias been 
out of work for too long. 
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The circular flow of migrants to and from town can be thought of in terms 
of a stream of people for whom P^ — ~ coming from the rural areas into town 
where, for the unsuccessful ones, P declines and r increases until the 
indifference point is past and they return to the farms, (see fig.l) 
migrate indifferent return 
P r time 
S 
Fig.l. The Flow of migrants to and from the urban areas (drawn for the case 
where w = 2w ) u a ' 
Turning to the urban-rural earnings gap, g, it is clear that for any 
P & r, a greater g will decrease the right hand side of inequality ( 7 ) with 
the obvious and familiar result that the incentive to migrate or continue the 
search for an urban job is increased. For a given r of, say, 10fo and urban 
and rural wages of shs . 1 4 0 / - and 70/- per month, respectively, the perceived 
probability above which it would be worth continuing to hunt for an urban job 
10$ 
would be (140-707 = 10$. If W , the urban wage rose to shs. 210/- per 
70" U 
month, with r and W remaining where they were, any probability of finding an cl 
urban job above 5% in a particular year would motivate a migrant to stay in 
the pool of applicants. 
We must now ask what the effect of education is on our prospective 
migrant and his calculation. The two clearly identifiable effects are on 
p, the probability of finding a job, and on the wage gap, g, that he sees 
when he looks at the possible jobs for which he might qualify. In both cases 
the net effect of education is to substantially increase the attractiveness 
of migration in comparison with its attractiveness to his less educated 
fellows. 
There is considerable evidence that in Africa as well as elsewhere, edu-
cation is, rationally or not, frequently used as a selection device by 
! 
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employers, even for jobs not obviously requiring whatever education imparts. 
The employer, faced with a large number of applicants, and the requirement 
that he make a selection, can either devise a mechanism for evaluating and 
selecting prospective workers himself or use whatever information is already 
available to perform the. selection. The costs or the difficulty of the 
former usually drive the employer to the latter, and the latter frequently 
.... 7 
involves an educational record, with all its shortcomings. In any- event, 
the effect of education on ? is in general to elevate it for 'those 
individuals with more education than their fellows. It-is. undoubtedly a 
recognition of this effect that motivates, at least in part, the fervour . 
for education that is such a familiar characteristic of coiintries such as 
Kenya. . 
The problem that is less readily recognized (whose recognition is, in 
fact, resisted), and here again ue have the implications of the divergence 
between private and social returns, is that while education raises P for those 
who have had more education, it largely raises it at the expense of those who 
have had less. One hesitates to be categorical on this topic, but this writer 
is unaware of evidence to suggest that the expost P for the population as a 
whole is significantly raised by additional education per se. If (following 
Maurice Scott, 1972) the flow of workers hired into (wage or self-employment in) 
the urban sector each year is E (where presumably, H = h (ll) + q (ll) where N is 
the total labour "orce with h being its annual growth rate and q its quit-rate), 
A is the number of applicants who would like those jobs in that year, and P 
— T-T is the average then: p =~~— (8) 
xi. 
While the- P for any individual is, rationally or not, in general substantially 
elevated by that individual's education, this writer is of the.somewhat 
pessimistic and unpopular view that P is not, and that the net effect of 
education on P is, in fact, likely to be negative. 
To examine the plausibility of this view we should briefly lock at the 
possible effects of education on H and A. Starting with K, there are two 
principal reasons why the number of new people who find remunerative employ-
ment in the sector we arc discussing might be increased by more education: 
the first is that a more educated populace might be the occasion for more 
7 Perhaps the ultimate irony is the possibility that e.g. reliability or 
physical stength and academic performance are inversely related and that an 
employer will select on the latter criteria for one of the former qualities. 
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entrepreneurship and therefore "both more tarings and more "formal" self-
employment. While this is a proposition that certainly has appeal, there 
is precious little evidence to support it. Marris and Somerset in fact found 
that education was negatively related to entrepreneurship in their study, as Q 
did Callaway in Nigeria. One might add that there is little in the school 
experience that might "be expected to engender entrepreneurship in the school-
leaving population. (Attempts to analyse the effects of education as it should 
be rather than as it i_s ana as it is likely to be are implicit in a good deal 
of the naively sanguine approaches to this issue. Rational discussion of the 
curriculum and content of the school experience are highly relevant here.(e.g.Court) 
"If only" types of analysis are not). 
The second reason why education might have a positive effect is that the 
availability of a more educ ted work force might increase the rate of new 
investment, raising H. In Kenya there has been something of a history of idle 
investible resources, suggesting that skilled labour is the bottleneck to 
more rapid growth, The only question chat remains to be answered before 
concluding.that education can indeed r ise II is whether the schools are 
producing, the skills that are required to complement the investible. resources-. 
What is need is skilled, not necessarily schooled, labour. Again, .the 
average school experience is not necessarily goinf to make the applicant that 
much more attractive an employee for most jobs. While school performance may 
be used by employers to sort out the ability levels of a given group of 
apnlicants, employers are probably more interested in school performance as 
an an indication of differential intelligence (i.e. as a selection device) 
than the acquired (geography, French, history or scripture) knowledge that the 
8 One explanation frequently offered for these findings is that wl.ile 
the educated have opportunities in the existing formal wage—earning sector 
the uneducated do not. Entrepreneurship is therefore, in the "marginal man" 
tradition, the only outlet for their talents. Callaway is particularly 
insistent that, entrepreneurship is learned in the rough and tumble of the 
market place and not in hygenic (or otherwise) school buildings. Both of 
these notions slightly beg the question as to whether the more schooled 
prospective entrepreneur out of wage employment and in the market place 
struggle, is any improvement over the less schooled one. See Harris and 
Somerset, IJfO and Callaway, 1964. 
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school was trying to impart. There is oven some evidence that the products 
of technical schools, many of which go to considerable expense to teach 
specific skills, are 110 more desirable to employers than bright "trainable" 
9 
applicants who have not undergone the training. The training is often not 
exactly what is needed for the particular job, and in any event, some employers 
regard on-the-job training, experience and evaluation as irreplaceable. 
To the extent that education increases an individual's P without 
increasing H, the basic ingredient for Gary Field's(197l)"bumping" phenomenon 
and Bnil Rado's (l97l) "explosive model" is prosent. In the pure case of 
bumping, a more educated worker is preferred to a less educated one in 
any job, resulting in a continuing strong private motivation for education, 
and the entire labour force becoming more and more educated, without too much 
effect on the wage. At the point (which I would suspect varies between 
fields) at which the present value of the more educated employee's greater 
rproductivity over his less educated forbear is less than the cost of his 
education, the bumping system is clearly socially wasteful. The private 
motivation to get an education in order to x-jin in the job competition 
remains, but society's resources would better be invested elsewhere. 
9 Martin Godfrey, who has been examining toconical education and training 
in Kenya and relating it to employment "tells me that his interviews with 
trainees, trainers and employers have led him to very similar conclusions. 
Employers appear to be most dissatisfied with the products of vocational and 
technical schools, and hence quite unwilling to take them on as apprentices. 
The Directorate of Industrial Training in Nairobi recently sent out 3,000 
application forms to firms expected to be interested in recruiting "Craft 
Apprentices". There were 60 replies. A part of this lack of interest might 
well reflect the quality of the training which, judging from the very high 
failure rate at the various City and Guilds proficiency tests, leaves some-
thing to be desired. 
10 In this regard, the pervasive (in China) Maoist slogan of "combine 
theory and practice" is intriguing. Though a part of its motivation in the 
Chinese case is clearly political and anti-elitist, it is quite possible 
that the de-emphasis of formal schooling, at least at the siib-professional 
level, may well be a lower cost and equally efficient way of building a 
labour force. Professor robin's informal impression, however, was that the 
"practice" in the Chinese school system is little more than manual labour 
designed to imbue the students with appropriate class attitudes, while 
employing agencies do not seem to make much effort to impart the theory 
(except, again, ideological theory). It would, however, be hard to duplicate 
the discipline and dedication of the Chinese labour face. 
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Turning to A, and using (8) in (7) at what we called the point of a 
migrant's indifference between an urban search and a rural job, we might 
conceive of some kind of an equilibrium number of applicants that depends 
on the wage gap, g, and on H, and inversely 011 r for any given set of 
* jj . . potential migrants' propensities: A = (9) 
The question now becomes whether education -has some kind of exogenous effect 
on A, and if so, in which direction. 
It is frequently held that education increases the likelihood that 
an individual will migrate to the urban areas quite apart from the effect 
of education on his chance of finding a job, or on the earnings gap that he 
perceives. Education in this case alternatively "opens up new horizons", 
"alienates him from the land" or has some other effect that makes him more 
likely to migrate than someone with an otherwise equivalent economic motivation. 
In its extreme form there is little doubt that the notion that education 
itself alienates its products from their home and land has been grossly over-
stated; what has been taken to be migration resulting from the schooling 
itself is often migration because the motivation to migrate in terms of P and 
to use our formulation, is much stronger (see Foster, 19^5 for a well-
documented refutation of the earlier naive form of the "white collar preference" 
hypothesis) . 
Nevertheless, since a good deal of the motivation for education, both 
for the recipients and their families, is to increase the recipients chances 
of a high wage or "urban sector" job, the imperative that the rural school-
leaver migrate is much greater than for his uneducated colleague. .Ue are 
perhaps on thin ground here, since the social pressure on a school-leaver 
to migrate is undoubtedly the result of the pressure group's perception of 
the economic variables we have discussed. However, Joyce Iloock's study 
(1972) of a "Non-Rural Village" some hundreds of miles from Nairobi, makes 
it clear that education is seen strictly ins '.rum ant ally as a mechanism for 
attaining a wage-earning job and, even if that job is known to be virtually 
unattainable, the school-leaver is under a heavy obligation to those who 
have financed his education to go in search of it. 
If education does have a separate effect on migration, (allowed by 
Godfrey, 1972 but discounted by Todaro, 1971) i.e. apart from its effect 
011 the perceived probability of finding a job and the perccived wage gap, 
then the effect of educational expansion and a larger number of school-
leavers is that A, the number of applicants for urban jobs is augmented* 
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If, following our earlier discussion, the number of urban sector hirings, H, 
is not expanded as a result of the education Dy at least the same multiple, 
the net effect of education on P, as a glance at identity (3) will show, is 
negative. The average probability of any applicant finding a job is reduced. 
Under these circumstances education can also be said to load to greater 
unemployment. 
Locking briefly at the influence of education on the wage gap, 
W - " 
— (or g), one's expectation that it is larger for those with more W 
education than those with less is strongly born out by the evidence. Without 
reproducing Todaro's table of average monthly money income for LU"ban 
migrants in Nairobi by educational level, we can say that between 1964 and 
1968, the average income for those in the Rempcl sample of migrants who had 
completed some secondary school (Forms 1-6) ranged between 167% and 238^ higher 
than the average income of those who had no schooling. J"~ 
While the above Rempel-Todaro figures are suggestive, being average urban 
earnings for each group, they include the earnings (if any) of those without 
formal, or even -any, employment along with the employed; they thus really 
refer to expected earnings, PW rather than W . If the migration of each u u 
educational category is such as to maintain a uniform P between categories, 
the above percentage gaps retain their meaning. If the ex^  PJ$st_ P varies 
between categories, the comparisons between categories will bo a hybrid rather 
than a w comparison. 
11 Calculated from Todaro 1971, table 6. The data on which the table is 
based was collected for Rempcl 1971. It is interesting, incidentally to note 
that the average earnings for the migrants with 1-4 years of schooling is not 
significantly higher, and in two out of the five years is noticeably'lower than 
the group with 110 schooling, suggesting that the first four years of education, 
if the education is then terminated, are not awarded a value in the job market. 
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Another problem with the data quoted is that it does not include W . a 
The question is: to what extent does W , the earnings in the agricultural ,, . a 
sector, vary with educational attainment. To speculate oilofehis topic would 
"bo to anticipate the findings of the data analysis upon which I am now 
planning to embark. It must be recognized, however, that neither small-'farm 
sector wages nor a fortiori self-employment earnings are likely to be subject 
to the' inflated "educational pseudo-earnings" that frequently occur in-the 
formal urban sector. Education, in other words, is unlikely to be rewarded 
unless it enhances productivity. In the extreme case, education would not 
affect agricultural earnings at all while it.would substantially enhance 
urban earnings. In this case education would widen the wage gap by the 
increment in urban earnings attributable to the education. Even if 'rao--= Jue 
w w a u 
(whore e means that w includes the incremental wage attributable to education), 
so that the percentage enhancement of the wage was identifal in the two 
sectors, the -greater absolute wage increment in the urban sector would mean 
that the more educated workers found themselves with a greater economic 
incentive to migrate. • 
The final, and perhaps most serious problem with trying to use current 
urban wage—by—educational-level data is its static nature. If something akin 
to the Fields "bumping" phenomenon does take place, with more educated people 
being chosen to fill lower and lower slots on the labour skill hierarchy, 
this cannot avoid putting downward pressure 011 the w (where i refers to 
the »ducational level). Note that this does not require a decline in the 
wage for any particular postf it is, in fact, quite consistent with an 
increase in wages. All that is required is that (e.g.) whereas a fourth 
form leaver used to be able to step right into a senior clerical, or even 
even executive job£ he now has to be satisfied with the job of a messenger, 
which carries a considerably reduced wage tag. What is'clearly needed is 
a dynamic model in which all the variables entering the migrants calculus 
are subscripted for educational category, but that is not the task of this 
paper. Suffice it to repeat that the most evident observation about the 
educational sector is the rapidly expanding supply of almost every 
category of educated manpower; and that ;.his expansion on the supply 
side in completely unmatched by any absorptive capacity in the formal 
wage-earning sector. Under these circumstances, either W ^ or P 
(i again referring to educational category) arc Ooing to have to come 
down, there is no alternative. Once again it should be stressed: the 
private incentive, and therefore the political pressure for more and 
more education will remain, but at the point where the labour force's 
increased real productivity does not at least justify the educational 
expenditure, there is no social justification for educational 
12 expansion. 
As has been mentioned, the private justification for education 
has been almost exclusively in terms of a formal sector, wage earning 
job and, if the bumping phenomenon holds, it will remain so, long after 
the point where there is any social justification for the education. Even 
as far as this private incentive is concerned, however, the increasing 
costs of education, the declining probability of getting a job, or the 
declining wage, or all three, will eventually become evident to both the 
students and their parents, with the urban orientation of the incentive 
12 It is not, incidentally, being asserted that the bumping system is 
necessarily socially wasteful, or even that the point at which it becomes 
wasteful has yet been reached. The educational system itself, as a final 
user of its own product, is one case where one might expect the ousting 
of less educated by more educated workers to have positive benefit; there 
is little doubt that the training and extension staff of government 
agricultural institutions is another (to be certain of this, of course, 
one would need to know the differential effect on farmer output of 
contact with extension workers of different educational levels; there 
is some evidence that formal schooling, or even specific initial 
technical training is less important than institutional arrangements 
that build in constant retraining and up-grading of these personnel but, 
ceteris paribus, the usual assumption is that education helps.(See David 
Leonard, 1973 for some interesting findings on this topic.). One of the 
effects of bumping is likely to be the forcing of better (or at least, 
more educated) people into less atisactive areas where, perhaps, they 
will more than pay for their education. 
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for schooling perhaps becoming dulled somewhatAt that point, and we 
would emphasize again the lag involved hero, and presumably an informational 
or cultural lag should also be added to the objective lag described in 
the last paragraph, parents and students will justify their educational 
investments in terms of incremental productivity in the informal, 
agricultural and self-employed sector. Under these circumstances the 
type of education demanded by the rural clentele of the educational system 
1 A 
would of course be totally different. The social case for the rethinking 
and reorientation of of the educational system and educational priorities 
is upon us. One might predict that it will be a few years before the 
private case, and therefore the political pressure, catch up. 
And where does all of this lead us? First of all, in any 
assessment of the economic payoff af education, the use of the wage, or 
life-time earnings profiles by education on the basis of interviews at 
factory gates in principal cities to evaluate the benefits of education 
(sec Thias and Carnoy, 1972) must, in view of our discussion, be seen 
as a somewhat hazardous approach likely to shod a misleading light on 
13 If the bumping system held for all sectors of the economy there would 
presumably be no end to the private demand for more education. As soon 
as a sector is introduced where the educational label is not the sole 
criterion of selecti Olio "diC re is a point, prior to a population of Ph.D.s, 
that the demand for education declines. In view of the fact that employers 
are often quite concious of the "over-educated for the job" possibility, 
with over-education generally implying that a worker is less amenable to 
discipline, less reliable and, because of his elevated expectations, 
more dissatisfied than a worker with less education (sec I. Berg for 
considerable evidence on this subject), the assumptions of the explosive 
model will, in any event, cease to hold long before that point is reached. 
14 All of this raises a fundamental role conflict of the educational 
system; it's first, manpower planning type of role, that of equipping 
the economy with the educated manpower it needs, tends to make the system 
compartmentalized, exclusive and elitist. Its second and highly signifi-
cant role is in the area of equity; to do something about equalizing 
opportunities so that merit, rather than breeding, determine access to 
elite status for each succeding generation. Talcing this second role 
seriously virtually precludes any policy sanction for the sort of 
dualization to which our analysis seems to be pointing. 
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investment decision-making in the sector. Urban w.ges must be viewed 
as "disequilibrium" wages in every sense of the word. While they may 
represent the .exgost marginal productivity of labour in the employing 
firms, simply because these firms will presumably take the wage that 
they must pay, and hire to the point where the contribution of the 
marginal worker is equal to that wage, they certainly do not represent 
the current market-clearing, scarcity price of labour by educational 
category. They are, in fact, a creature of labour market imperfections, 
and can not be thought of as reflecting the social value of the 
marginal, educationally subscripted labour unit. The further reason 
why the wage might be considered to be misleading is the dynamic one that 
the scarcities, especially :por the more educated categories of labour, 
are changing very rapidly, despite which the wages are predictably resistant 
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to any adjustment downward. .. Minimum wage legislation, trade union 
activity, and the tenuously based, self-fulfilling preconception that 
1c '.ds to the use of educational criteria as a job licencing mechanism, 
conspire to make modern sector wage by education data in a rate of 
return to education analysis, of modest enough value from a private 
15 Presumably, either wages on the probability of finding' a job 
can make the adjustment, thus more or less maintaining the expected 
wage. Richard Porter to whom I am grateful for a discussion on this 
issue, suggested th t ih.'.s expected wage might be a good indication 
.ofthe social or "shadow" wage. But unless this becomes the actual 
wage and the market is approximately cleared' (with allowances for 
"frictional unemployment" and unemplcyables, the percentage of which 
might be quite high where experience in wage employment is short-lived), 
it is not possible to think of this expected wage as the product of the 
marginal educated person. It will be the wage that motivates the private 
education decision, but cannot be used to motivate public investments. 
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financial point of view (though, the wage, weighted by the probability 
of getting that wage, should shed some light on the private case), and 
of virtually no value from the economic point of view. 
Secondly, it can now be seen, I think, that an investigation into 
the economic returns to the various forms of educative activity in the 
farm sector, and some information as to how knowledge factors af. ect 
the productivety to farmers and farms is central to pending decisions 
as to how far, and in which direcijon, to expand education. Ihe content 
of our discussion thus far also suggests far-reaching implications 
for the nature of the educative system, and for the relative weights 
that should be given .to the various components of the system. 
Essentially we have concluded that while the private educational 
investment decision is still likely to be geared toward the formal 
urban wage-earning; job, the social educational investment decision, i.e. 
decision to expand the size of the educational sector, must look to 
the payoff in the rural areas. Ne have, I think, also concluded that 
the time-honoured- use of wage data, with its time-honoured assumptions 
about the marginal productivity of skill subscripted (and therefore 
education subscripted?) labour cannot be relied upon as indicators of 
the social payoff of education, providing the basis for decision-making 
in this area. • 'i 
While, as we have indicated, our skepticism about wages may not 
apply in the agricultural small-holder sector to which attention now 
needs to be turned, in general, wo are now dealing with, family farms 
and self-employed farmers who do not earn a wage in the usual sense. 
Rather than rely, therefore, on either a highly dubious, or a non~ 
existant, wage, what is now required (and what we shall attempt in the 
near future) is an evaluation of these factors by more direct recourse 
to the production function. Ihis approach, whose spelling out is going 
to have to wait for a subsequent paper, has a number of advantages which 
we hope to exploit. Fundamentally they involve the possibility of 
capturing a far wider range of the effects of educative inputs on the 
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farm firm's productivity and value added, and of testing the mechanism 
by which production is affected. 
As a quick preview of the direction in which the analysis will 
now turn, let us briefly say that there are a number of possible ways 
in which educative inputs could.affect the productivity of the farmer-
entrepreneur. The first is obviously that he becomes a more efficient, 
knowledgable or skilled worker, that for given resources he thus 
extracts more output. The effect here may simply.be one of greater 
manual dexterity, or of more knowledge of how and,when to do things, 
a typical case being a farmer who learns how to prune his tea or coffee 
trees in a way that yields him greater output. The physical production 
process of the farm is full of numerous tasks that must be understood 
and mastered if the output from the issouces used is to be maximized. 
The contribution of education in this, case is to make the farmer a more 
efficient user of given resources. It seems likely that educative inputs 
that have this "worker effect" (to use Finis Welch's termf Welch, 1970) 
are likely to be of the type that reach the practicing farmer, or someone 
who very soon will become one, and teach him rather specific skills that 
refer to particular enterprises with which he is, or soon will be, 
involved. 
The second, and cjuite separate, effect that educative inputs might 
be expected to have are on what might be termed the "management, ability" 
of the farmer. In this case we assume a gap between the profit-maximizing 
combination of farm enterprises and inputs and that combination that the 
farmer is currently using. The contribution of education here"is the 
amount by which it closes the gap. .Technical skills undoubtedly enter 
this management decision-making contribution; without the technical 
knowledge, new lines of production for instance, can hardly be embarked 
upon. Fne principal contribution of education in this case, however, is 
in the area of the farmer's ability to choose, and to allocate his resources 
between the various possibilities open to him. In this sense, his 
education may result in his being aware of more of the alternatives, or 
at least of his being able to grasp the technical and the payoff 
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implications of the alternatives, or secondly it may simply improve 
his ability to calculate what the profit maximising combination or 
level of activities might be. The "efficient peasant" may on average 
be true, especially in circumstances of a static technology. When 
technology is rapidly changing and new, and often conflicting, 
information is constantly becoming available, there is no doubt that 
the ability to evaluate and decode the stream of information, and 
incorporate what is worth incorporating into a production system is i-
rewarded in the market, (see Nelson and Phelps, 1966). When, to this 
technical decoding task, is added the complications of fluctuating and 
uncertain prices for both inputs and outputs, it becomes clear that 
the-allocative-decisions of the farmer are highly complex. It is possible 
that education equips a farmer'to deal with this complexity better than 
his uneducated colleague. It seems likely that the educative inputs 
that perform this latter function are cf a different nature to the 
inputs that affect the farmers farming skills referred to in the 
previous paragraph. 
To conclude these somewhat random notes, let us, rather than 
attempting to summarise, keep our attention on the rual and agricultural 
sector. Tnere is little doubt that if agriculture is to be intensified 
and the productivity of the rural 
clFGclS inCPGclS ed, the stock of "human 
resource factors" and embodied knowledge must expand; its failure to 
expand can, in fact, where complementary factors are present, result 
in serious limitation to growth. To the extent that educational inputs 
increase this stock of useful knowledge, therefore, they are a crucial 
component of any serious, long-term effort to raise agricultural 
productivity. .-Traditional"factors' and traditional technologies may well 
(following Schultz) be efficiently used and leave little scope for 
improved productivity as a result of educative types of inputs. A large 
part of the agricultural development task, however, is precisely to 
introduce new factors of production and new technologies into the farm 
production systems of' large numbers of individuals. These new factors 
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•that are, we would contend, the "basis for the sort of agricultural 
growth that is now needed, require, and to a certain extent consist 
of, fresh knowledge and fresh skills embodied in farmers, and fresh 
sources of information streams to them. Whether this means that historical 
inputs of an educative nature explain the observed variation in a 
number of different indicators of farm performance will, it is hoped, 
soon become the subject of a rather more detailed, empirical 
investigation. 
In preparing this paper I have been much helped, and occassionally 
even influenced, by the thoughts of my IDS colleagues of whom I should mention 
Walter Elkan, Martin Godfrey and Richard Porter. George Johnson, though no 
longar here,has left an indelible stamp. And finally there is my wife, 
Maeva, who in the tradition of renaissance women has the capacity for getting 
interested in almost anything; even, occasionally, economics. 
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